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Abstract
We perform an empirical investigation to estimate the macroeconomic cost of September 11
attacks on the United States economy. We estimate the impact of the attacks to be approximately
a 0.50 percentage point decrease in GDP growth or $60 billion. Our upper bound estimate of the
impact of September 11 is approximately twice that or $125 billion.
KEYWORDS: Growth, Conflict, Terrorism
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1. Introduction
Nobel laureate Paul Samuelson once said “Science is a parasite: the greater the
patient population the better the advance in physiology and pathology; and out of
pathology arises therapy.”1 The year 2001 was a particularly difficult year marked
with corporate scandals, the headwinds of a recession, and the tragedy of
September 11. As a matter of economic curiosity, we wish to reexamine the
episode with hindsight of seven years to better understand the economic
consequence of that period. While our paper cannot hope to begin to gain an
understanding or appreciation of the human tragedy of that time period, we do
stand to gain some scientific understanding as a result of the alliterated therapy.
Unfortunately, estimating the consequence of September 11 using
standard macroeconomic times series is not straightforward. For the United
States, there were many macroeconomic shocks occurring simultaneously, leaving
few degrees of freedom to estimate the separate impact of the attack on the World
Trade Center. For example, there were the financial difficulties of the dot com
bubble bursting as demonstrated by the drop in the Nasdaq which had peaked in
March 2000 at 5,132 only to descend to 1,108 by October 2002. There were also
significant corporate scandals epitomized by Enron’s Chief Skilling leaving in
August 2001. Contractionary Federal Reserve Policy also placed a drag on the
economy as the federal funds rate was increased to 6.25 percent in December
2000, the highest rate since February of 1991.
The shocks were not all contractionary, however. Realizing the recession
was a serious possibility, the Federal Reserve quickly changed to an expansionary
policy by dropping the federal funds rate to its lowest point ever or 1 percent
through June 2003. The federal government also responded by engaging in
expansionary fiscal policy. The Bush tax cuts of 2001-3 have been estimated to be
$188 billion or similar in magnitude to Reagan tax cuts.
Given these simultaneous shifts in the economic landscape, it is
challenging to precisely estimate the macroeconomic consequence of September
11. So, rather than attempt a direct calculation from the United States experience
during 2001, we adopt a different empirical strategy. We appeal to other country
experiences and compare their histories to the United States to estimate the
economic cost of September 11. Finally, as the impact of September 11 may be
larger than has been typically seen, we employ an upper bound estimate using the
results from across the globe.
To conduct our empirical investigation, we first begin by estimating the
long-term effect of terrorism on our cross-section of countries. We do this, to
ensure that the effects are not merely “washed-out” over time. Second, we
1

Quoted from his Nobel address in 1985 at Trinity University.
1
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estimate the short-term effects using panel regression techniques. Finally, we
conduct a series of robustness checks using VARs, quantile regressions, and
welfare simulations. In this way, we are able to see how consistent our estimates
are and what would be our upper bound estimate.
This exercise follows a long tradition to try to understand the economic
consequences of conflict and peace. For example, Garfinkel (1990), Grossman
(1991), Skaperdas (1992), Hess and Orphanides (1995, 2001a,b), and Alesina and
Spolaore (1997) have been responsible for investigating the importance of arms
races, revolution, diversionary war, institutions, and the size of the nation-state.
The impact of terrorist, distinct from other forms of conflict, has become a
topic of research more recently. Most notably, Blomberg, Hess and Orphanides
(2004) show that terrorism is indeed a drag on the economy, though not as
significant as civil or external war. Since then there have been several papers that
have investigated the economic impact of terrorism, most recently summarized in
Sandler, Enders and Arce (2009).
The results in this study concur with the previous one. However, our
investigation also suggests that these results are more robust than we previously
thought and slightly larger in magnitude if our upper bound estimates are to be
taken seriously. We estimate the impact of the September 11 attacks to be
approximately a 0.50 percentage point decrease in GDP growth or $60 billion.
Our upper bound estimate of the impact of September 11 is approximately twice
that or $125 billion.
2. The Data and Empirical Regularities
This section describes the empirical regularities of the data and their sources. The
economic data is the Penn World Table data from Summers and Heston (1991).
The conflict data is from ITERATE, Brecher, Wilkenfeld and Moser (1988), and
Gurr et al (2003).
The “International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events” (ITERATE)
data from Mickolus et. al. (2003) defines a transnational terrorist event: “the use,
or threat of use, of anxiety-inducing, extra-normal violence for political purposes
by any individual or group, whether acting for or in opposition to established
governmental authority, when such action is intended to influence the attitudes
and behavior of a target group wider than the immediate victims and when,
through the nationality or foreign ties of its perpetrators, its location, the nature of
its institutional or human victims, or the mechanics of its resolution, its
ramifications transcend national boundaries.” (Mickolus et. al., page 2.)
ITERATE provides over 14,000 incidents of terrorism across 177
countries from 1968 to 2003. The raw data is grouped into four broad categories
that denote incident characteristics, terrorist characteristics, victim characteristics

2
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and finally, life and property losses. Since we cannot control for the significance
of individual events or identify some of the underlying information that may be
missing, we define a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if a terrorist event is
recorded for a given country year and 0 otherwise.
The external conflict data are obtained from the most recent update to
Brecher, Wilkenfeld and Moser (1988). External conflict is defined by Brecher,
Wilkenfeld and Moser (1988) as: “a specific act, event or situational change
which leads decision-makers to perceive a threat to basic values, time pressure for
response and heightened probability of involvement in military hostilities. A
trigger may be initiated by: an adversary state; a non-state actor; or a group of
states (military alliance). It may be an environmental change; or it may be
internally generated.” (page 3)
The Internal war data, obtained from Gurr et al (2003), provides data that
originates from four broader categories to include ethnic conflict, genocide,
revolutionary conflict and regime change which does not include nonviolent
transitions. As there may be some unintended overlap between the data coding
and actual incidence of internal conflict and terrorism, we include both in our
empirical investigation. On a cursory level, there is little evidence that the internal
conflict data is merely an overlap of terrorism. The pair-wise correlation
coefficient is quite small at about 0.06, once controlling for country effects, which
gives us some comfort when considering measurement issues. As well, there
could be strategic complementarities and/or substitutabilities among these types
of conflict, which could either increase or lessen the effects of terrorism on
economic activity.
2.1. The Geography of Terrorist Incidents
Let us return to a basic overview of the terrorism data.2 Blomberg Hess and
Weerapana (2003) have shown that the areas of the world with the most terrorism
are in the Americas and Europe whereas there appears to be far less terrorism in
Africa.3
This is usefully summarized by a map of the world (Figure 1). Each
country has a graduated color with the darkest representing the countries with the
most terrorist events and the lightest representing the countries with the least. The
areas of the world that appear to be those with the most terrorism are the
Americas and Europe whereas there appears to be far less terrorism in Africa.
This quick snapshot may suggest that terrorism is a rich democracies
2

Also see Blomberg, Hess and Weerapana (2003) for additional findings of terrorism
and income, region and governance.
3
When the terrorism data is adjusted for population, the Middle East is also found to
have a high incidence of terrorism.
3
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problem. However, countries neighboring to high terrorist incident states such as
the United States and Germany do not share such high incidence rates. For
example, regions such as Canada and Scandinavia have very little if any
terrorism. Moreover, as income and democratization increased from 1995 to
2003, terrorism per country year actually fell.
Blomberg, Hess and Orphanides (2004) have provided more insight into
the empirical regularities of transnational terrorism and the economy and other
forms of conflict. They demonstrate that, at first glance, terrorism seems to
resemble possibly less economically significant incidents of internal war.
Terrorism is similar to internal war in its frequency the incidence of both is
considerably higher than that of external conflict. However, terrorism appears to
be positively correlated with income, while internal and external conflict are
negatively correlated. A closer look reveals that much of this relationship is due to
country fixed effects.
The greater incidence of terrorism in democracies and high income
countries may be important when calculating the cost of 9/11 from the average
impact. Hence, we will also consider quantile regression analysis that will allow
us to examine the impact across the distribution of growth and income. In this
way, we can examine whether the impact in the United States, a high income
democracy, is significantly different from the average impact. As will be shown in
subsequent subsections, the results are not sensitive to such specifications.

4
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3. Econometric Evidence
The purpose of this section is to provide our estimates employed to calculate the
macroeconomic consequence of September 11. The section begins by first
examining the long run implications of terrorism on growth to show that the
effects are not “washed away” over time. Then, we estimate the average impact
of terrorism on growth from panel growth regressions so that we can calculate the
economic cost of September 11. Finally, we conduct a variety of robustness
checks using quantile regression analysis, VARs, welfare analysis and estimate
the over different economic variables.
We find that the incidence of terrorism in a country in a given year in the
long run is associated with a reduction in per capita growth by less than one tenth
of a percentage point, similar to the impact associated with internal conflict. And,
while the impact of terrorism on growth is larger once controlling for time and
fixed effects in panel regressions, the impact is smaller than either that of internal
or external conflict. We estimate this impact of a terrorist event to be
approximately a loss of 0.50 percentage points of growth for a given year. In
addition, we provide evidence that terrorism is associated with a reallocation of
income away from private investment spending and towards government
spending. These estimates are not significantly different when viewed through the
“lens” of welfare economics or quantile regression analysis.
3.1. Cross Country Growth Regressions
We begin these exercises by constructing our baseline model by appealing to the
literature on economic growth. As in Blomberg, Hess and Orphanides (2004), we
extend the standard Solow model to include a few select factors that have been
shown to be important in determining growth. Our specification is consistent with
previous research (see Levine and Renault (1992) for example) that shows many
of the factors included in growth regressions are not statistically significant once
other factors are introduced. So, once a researcher includes the relevant
information, many theoretical results are not supported by the underlying data.
Researchers who have then attempted to include geography or policy variables
such as openness or institutional variables such as democracy or rule of law, have
therefore been unable to establish a strong empirical relationship.
Our baseline model includes investment as a share of GDP (I/Y), the log
of initial GDP (lny0i),, a dummy for Africa (AFRICA) and a dummy variable for
non-oil commodity exporters (COM) found to be robust in other research [see
Easterly and Kraay (2001)].
Δyi = β 0 + β1 COM i + β 2 AFRICA i + β3 ln y0i + β 4 I/Y i + β5 T i + β 6 I i + β 7 E i + ε i .

(1)

5
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To control for possible reverse causality, we followed the suggestion in De La
Croix and Doepke (2003) and employing initial values of the investment share as
instruments.
This is based on the reasoning that as predetermined variables which
would be known at time t and would not have an independent impact outside of
its contemporaneous effect. Hence, we also employ initial values as instruments.
We adopt their approach in selecting instruments as initial values have intuitive
appeal as being predetermined and we do not wish to turn this paper into an
exercise on optimal instrument selection.
Table 1 reports the results from the purely cross-sectional regressions.
Column 1 is the base case following the growth literature. Columns 2 and 3
sequentially include terrorism (T) and internal conflict (I). Columns 4 and 5
include external conflict separate and then together with other forms of conflict to
demonstrate how the different types of conflict influence growth. Columns 6
through 10 repeat the same regressions with one change - IV/GMM is employed
to instrument for the endogeneity of investment.
Column 1 shows that investment has a positive impact and initial income,
Africa and commodity exporters have a negative impact on growth. The sign of
these effects are all quite similar to what was found in Blomberg, Hess and
Orphanides (2004)
Column 2 provides our estimate on the impact of terrorism which is
negative and statistically significant. An economic interpretation of the coefficient
is that if a country were to experience a terrorist event in each year in the sample,
per capita growth would drop by about 1.7 percent. To estimate the impact of one
conflict for a given year, we must divide the coefficient by 35. Column 4 shows
external conflict appears to have a large and negative impact, though it is
insignificant in the long run. Columns 6 through 10 show these results are not
biased due to joint causality issues. The general results hold on the impacts on
growth using the IV/GMM specification.

6
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In Table 2, we reexamine the evidence presented in Table 1 in terms of
panel regressions. The main differences are that we control for time and fixed
effects in the regressions; we are able to examine other sub-samples because we
have sufficient observations; and we include one more statistically significant
covariate—log of openness (lnop)—as it appears to be highly statistically
significant and of the expected theoretical sign, namely.4
Δyit = γ 0 + γ 1 lnop it −1+ γ 3 ln yit −1 + γ 4 I/Y it −1+ γ 5 T it + γ 6 I it + γ 7 E it + φZ + ε it

(2)

where Z is a set of time and country fixed effects.5
Column 1 shows that I/Y and lagged GDP per capita continue to be
statistically significant with the theoretically predicted sign. The sign associated
with Openness, lnop, is also consistent with theory. In columns 1 through 4 we
present the coefficient on terrorism which we estimate to be larger than in the
cross-section and we find that terrorism reduces growth by about 0.5 percent in a
given year. Columns 5 through 10 provide the results for other sub-samples and
the results are broadly consistent across the different categories.
As a robustness check, we also consider the results using an alternative
definition for terrorism, the number of incidents per capita. The results were not
sensitive to such an extension. Moreover since researchers may be tempted to
construct measures that will support their conjectures a priori, it is more objective
to employ our agnostic approach regarding data construction which is done in all
other tables. And, since the point of the paper is to investigate the impact of
terrorism as compared to other types of conflict, redefining terrorism in per capita,
unlike the other types of conflict, terms or by intensity of conflict may be giving it
special treatment relative to the other forms of conflict.
The results tell a consistent story. Terrorism appears to have a statistically
strong negative impact on growth. This remains true even when considering other
types of conflict and endogeneity concerns.
To calculate the economic impact of such an effect we merely interact the
coefficient with the dollar value of GDP in 2006 our base year. As the impact is
not statistically relevant in previous or future years, we only calculate the impact
of 9/11 for the year 2001. In this case, we estimate the economic cost to be $60
billion.

4

As in the earlier case, we considered various institutional and policy variables with
little statistical impact and do not show them here. As well, using instruments for
investment and openness provided broadly similar results.
5
Estimating the model using a random effects estimator instead of a fixed effects
estimator does not provide any qualitative change to what is reported in Tables 4 and 5.
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However, this presumes the average impact of an international terrorist
event is the same as the impact in the United States in 2001. There are many
reasons to presume this assumption is restrictive. First, the severity of the attack
was surely larger for 9/11 than for other attacks. Using casualties as a metric,
2,976 died during the attack on September 11. For many of other terrorist attacks,
there were no casualties. Second, as the incidence of terrorism is higher in high
income democracies such as the United States, it is also possible that the impact
in these areas is not the same as the average impact.
One way (albeit a crude way) to estimate the impact in the United States is
to use the upper bound confidence interval from the average estimate. In this case,
a two standard deviation estimate from the average estimate is $125 billion. There
are, of course, other ways to explore how different the impact was during the 9/11
attacks. These ways are analyzed in the following subsection.

9
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3.2. Robustness Checks
In this subsection, we consider four different methodologies to see if the results
from the previous section are fragile. First, we re-estimate the model analyzing
different parts of the cross-national income or growth distribution. Second, we
calculate the cost with regards to lost utility rather than only lost GDP. Third, we
calculate the loss to components of GDP rather than only GDP itself. Finally, we
calculate the loss using a structural VAR. In summary, we find our results
consistent with our earlier findings that September 11 resulted in lost GDP of $60
billion. The upper bound estimate continues to be a loss of $125 billion.
3.2.1. Quantile Regressions
In this subsection, we provide the results using quantile regression analysis.
Quantile estimation is a type of regression when to estimate of the various
quantiles (such as the median) of a population. Since the macroeconomic impact
of terrorism may be different on 9/11 than the average impact, we consider
techniques that allow us to estimate the impact on different parts of the
distribution.
One advantage of using quantile regression to estimate the median, rather
than the mean, is that quantile regression will be more robust in response to large
outliers. More importantly for our purposes, we can consider other parts of the
distribution a well. Since U.S. growth in 2001 was in the 70th percentile, we can
consider the impact, estimating the model using absolute deviations at the 70th
fractile. Or, if one believes that 9/11 was an extreme event, we can estimate the
model at the 90th fractile.
Table 3 reports the results from this exercise. The model estimated is a
slight extension of the model estimated in Table 2, excluding openness in some
cases due to data limitations and including regional dummy variables in others
due to estimation limitations that do not allow the inclusion of country fixed
effects. Column 1 and 2 provide the baseline OLS results including
contemporaneous terrorism and lagged terrorism in the regression. As reported
previously, only contemporaneous terrorism is statistically significant with
approximately a negative 0.5 percentage point impact on GDP per capita growth.
Column 3 estimates the model using quantile regression techniques estimated at
the median or Q = .5. Columns 4 - 7, then consider various points along the
distribution of growth, from Q = .1, .75, .9, .95. The impact of terrorism on
growth is negative and statistically significant at each point, though the magnitude
rises significantly for Q = .9, .95.
This may be better seen in Figure 2 which depicts the estimated impact of
terrorism on growth across the entire distribution. The solid green line depicts the

11
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TABLE 3: QUANTILE REGRESSIONS: LOST GDP DUE
TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM ATTACKS
Tit
T2001

OLS
-.446**
[0.218]
- .054
[0.663]

OLS
Q=.5
-0.444** -0.357***
[0.212]

[0.107]

Q=.1
-0.14

Q=.75
Q=.9
-0.440** -0.698***

TO

Q=.95
1 236***
[0.351]

[0.348]

[0.173]

[0.229]

-0.223
[0.190]
0.067**
[0.026]
-1.617***
[0.492]
-1.301***
[0.493]
-1.096*
[0.601]
-4.909***
[0.594]
-2.089***

-0.862***
[0.095]
0.071***
[0.010]
-0.689**
[0.269]
-0.974***
[0.250]
0.218
[0.297]
-1.055***
[0.296]
-2.573***

-1.184***
[0.136]
0.072***
[0.014]
-0.301
[0.350]
-0.673**
[0.343]
0.009
[0.400]
0.677*
[0.403]
-3.379***

[0.162]
0.242
[0.178]
0.004
[0.404]
-0.675*
[0.360]

[0.516]
1.383***
[0.524]
0.052
[1.317]
-0.19
[1.134]

[0.255]
0.027
[0.295]
-0.389
[0.654]
-0.954*
[0.559]

[0.341]
-0.519
[0.409]
-0.48
[0.831]
-1.18
[0.720]

1[0.218]
235***
0.069***
[0.023]
-0.119
[0.551]
-1.184**
[0.504]
-0.173
[0.643]
1.929***
[0.580]
3 590***
[0.539]
-0.786
[0.609]
-1.055
[1.262]
-1.805**
[0.868]

4744

4744

4744

4744

4744

-0.071
[0.212]
lny it_1
-4.382*** -4.391*** -0.606***
[0.369]
[0.369]
[0.059]
I/Y it_1
0.60*** 0.060*** 0.081***
[0.017]
[0.017]
[0.006]
SSAFR
-1.469***
[0.160]
LAT
-1.187***
[0.154]
EASIA
-0.037
[0.182]
MIDEAST
-1.280***
[0.182]
POOR
-1.636***
T it_1

RICH
NAMER
OCEANIA
Observation
s

4709

4709
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FIGURE 2: IMPACT OF TERRORISM ON GDP GROWTH ACROSS DISTRIBUTION

estimate at each fractile and the graph line depicts the confidence interval. The
dotted line is the OLS estimate. Notice that the impact of terrorism is negative in
most of the fractiles and statistically significant once the distribution is around Q
= .3. The slope becomes only becomes steeper around Q = .9. This means that
OLS estimates are not that different from quantile estimates for most of the
distribution. Figure 2 also shows the point at which the United States is in the
distribution. It is almost exactly where the OLS estimate equals the quantile
estimate again providing more evidence that the earlier results are not fragile.
As the United States is in the Q = .7 portion of the distribution, one might
argue that the impact of 9/11 is somewhere in between Q = .5 and Q = .75 which
is similar to the OLS estimate. In this case, the economic consequence of 9/11
would be estimated to be approximately $60 billion. However, if one believes that
9/11 had a significant deleterious impact on growth, one might chose the upper
bound estimate at Q = .9 or Q = .95. In this case, the impact would be similar to
the upper bound OLS estimate of $125 billion. In summary, the results from the
earlier section are robust to quantile regression techniques.
3.2.2. Welfare Calculations
This section provides utility measures in estimating the consequence of
September 11th following Lucas (1987). The methodology is adapted
from Blomberg (2009).

13
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Formally, we begin with a representative individual who lives in country i
with lifetime utility described by the following equation:
1− ρ
⎧∞
⎤⎫
−( s −t ) ⎡ Cis
U it = Et ⎨∑(1 + θ )
⎢1 − ρ ⎥ ⎬,
⎣
⎦⎭
⎩ s =t

(3)

1 2

where Cs = (1 + μi ) s −t C exp[εis − 2σ εi ] , Δε is = υis is a normal, i.i.d. mean-zero shock
with variance σ ε2 , and μi is the growth rate of consumption. Using the fact that
i

exp[1 − ρ ]ε is is log-normally distributed, we can then obtain:

Et {Cis1− ρ } = (1 + μi )(1− ρ )( s −t ) Ci

1− ρ

[{

}

]

exp − (1 − ρ ) ρσ i2 /2 ( s − t ) .

(4)

where σ i2 denotes the variance of υis = Δε is . Assuming that the following holds
for all i countries,

{

}

Φ i ≡ (1 + θ ) −1 (1 + μi )1−ρ exp− (1 − ρ ) ρσ i2 /2 < 1

(5)

and substituting (4) into (3), we obtain expected utility as:
⎡ C 1− ρ ⎤
−1
U it = ⎢ i ⎥[1 − Φ i ] .
⎢⎣ 1 − ρ ⎥⎦

(6)

Instead of a world without consumption uncertainty, as Lucas (1987)
proposed for his measure of the welfare costs of business cycles, we propose
comparing the expected welfare from each country remaining in its realized path
of consumption, to another synthetic path of consumption where there is no state
of transnational terrorism.
Formally, to ``price'' the amount that a representative household in each
country would pay in order to obtain the peaceful path of consumption, we return
to Lucas' methodology.6. In other words, we now solve for the amount of current
consumption, τ i , that equates the expected welfare of remaining on the current
path of consumption to one where consumption is devoid of conflict, namely:
*

6

We now denote the mean and variance of the log-change of per-capita consumption in a peaceful

world as

μi*

and

σ i2* , respectively.
14
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1− ρ
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}

where Φ*i ≡ (1 + θ ) −1 (1 + μi* )1− ρ exp− (1 − ρ ) ρσ i2*/2 .

Solving for τ i* and assuming that Ci = Ci* , we have:
1

⎡ 1 − Φ i ⎤ 1− ρ
τ i* = ⎢
− 1.
*⎥
⎣ 1 − Φi ⎦

(8)

To understand how potentially enhanced consumption growth and reduced
consumption volatility can effect the economic welfare costs of conflict, first,
define Δσ i2 ≡ σ i2* − σ i2 and Δμi ≡ μi* − μi . A log-linear approximation of
expression (8) in the neighborhood of Δμi = Δσ i2 = 0 yields:
⎡ Φi ⎤
2
−1
⎥ ⋅ − ( ρ/2)Δσ i + (1 + μi ) Δμi .
1
−
Φ
i⎦
⎣

τ i* ≈ ⎢

[

]

(9)

Ceteris paribus, if a more peaceful world can deliver more growth and less
volatility, each of these factors will raise the amount that a representative
individual would pay in order to get rid of conflict.
In developing a baseline specification for a country’s per-capita
consumption growth, and how conflict might affect it, the simple permanent
income hypothesis (PIH) provides a very reasonable starting point. Hence, the
baseline specification we adopt is:
Δc& = α 1 + α 2Tit + I i + y t + eit ,

(10)

where again Δc& is the log-difference of per-capita consumption for country i at
time t , I i and yt are estimated individual and time fixed effects, respectively and
T is a terrorist event. As we do not have reliable consumption per capita data for
the entire time sample, we employ GDP per capita data as a proxy assuming that
the growth rate must be equated in the steady state. For the sample period 19682003, over 177 countries, we estimate α 2 = −.397 and find it be significant at the
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0.05 percent level. As our model is suggestive of a lower bound, we employ an
estimate of α 2 = −.174 or the original estimate plus one standard error.
From these results, one can construct a ``synthetic'' growth rate were an
economy to be perpetually at peace as follows. From the estimated, fitted values
of equation (10), each country's ``peaceful'' growth rate at time t is just
μˆ& ≡ cx = Iˆi + yˆ t + eˆit . Averaging this yields each country's peaceful growth rate of
T
cx .
per-capita consumption, μ&ˆ = (1/T )

∑

t =1

The construction of a synthetic measure of the volatility (either standard
deviation or variance) of consumption during peace involves two steps: estimating
the mean squared growth in consumption during peace and the squared mean
growth in consumption during peace. Fortunately, the latter has been calculated,
( μˆ i* ) 2 . Hence, to insure that this volatility measure does not become negative, we
adopt the following specification for the squared growth of per-capita
consumption.
| cx |2 = exp{2 ⋅ [δ1 ⋅ Tit I i + yt + uit ]}
(11)
According to this exponential specification, the squared change in per-capita
consumption growth will always be positive, and one can estimate the fixed
individual and time effects and the effect of conflict on volatility using non-linear
least squares. A more appealing approach, however, is to take natural logs of both
sides of (11) so that one can estimate these same crucial parameters using OLS,
namely:
log (| cx |) = δ1Tit + I i + yt + uit

(12)

Notice that one can come up with a reasonable measure of the effect of conflict on
consumption volatility by estimating the parameters using OLS on the
transformed dependent variable. For the sample period 1968-2003, over 177
countries, we estimate δ1 = .31 and find it be significant at the 0.05 percent level.
As our model is suggestive of a lower bound, we employ an estimate of δ1 = .145
or the original estimate minus one standard error.
To implement the welfare calculations embodied in expression (8), we
need to provide parameter values for the discount rate ( θ ) and the coefficient of
relative risk aversion ( ρ ), in addition to the consumption growth and volatility
measures calculated from above. Clearly, changes in θ and ρ will affect τ i* .
Four important issues in the selection of these parameters should be kept in mind.
First, the parameter values should be plausible. Second, the parameters should be
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such that Φ i < 1 and Φ*i < 1 for all countries -- see expression (5). Third, the
parameter values selected should be suggestive of a lower bound for τ i* . Fourth,
the reader should get an indication of the robustness of τ i* to changes in the
values chosen for θ and ρ . We provide results for the welfare measures using
θ = .08 and ρ = 2 which are standard in the literature. The general qualitative
results are not sensitive to slight deviations in θ and ρ .
Once this exercise has been conducted, we can compare the synthetic path
of no terrorism to the path with terrorism. This deviation is a measure of lost
welfare due to terrorism. What does the analysis yield? Again, we find a result
very similar to what was found using the OLS estimates. We find the lost welfare
in dollar terms to be approximately $80 billion. While this number is slightly
larger than the GDP lost measure of $60 billion, it is not significantly larger.
Moreover, given that the utility-based measure attempts to take into account lost
welfare due to uncertainty, it is remarkable to see that the original results continue
to be supported.
3.3. Compositional Effects

The central finding from the results reported above is that economic activity
appears to be impaired by conflict. Moreover, these results suggest that the
macroeconomic impact of 9/11 was a loss of approximately $60 billion with an
upper bound of $125 billion. In this section, we wish to analyze which GDP
component the process may operate concentrating on investment and government
spending.
The results in Table 4 show the results from these regressions. Our results
show terrorism causes a reduction in investment as a percentage of GDP of
approximately one half of a percentage point. Columns 1 to 4 show that the result
is statistically significant across various specifications. The results in columns 5
through 8, show that terrorism has the opposite impact on government spending
as a percentage of GDP causing the spending rate to rise by approximately 0.4
percentage points. Terrorism appears to cause government spending to crowd in
while terrorism appears to cause investment spending to be crowded out, leaving
the overall compositional effect relatively small.
3.4. A Structural VAR Model

In this section, we wish to trace out the dynamic effects of 9/11 using dynamic
panel analyses using a Structural vector auto regression (VAR). This approach
follows closely Blomberg, Hess and Orphanides (2004). Our abridged explanation
here is to allow for the co-determination of the log-level of real GDP per-capita,
as
well
as
dummy
variables
for
internal
conflict,
external
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conflict and terrorism.7 The reduced form errors, eYt, eTt, eEt, eIt are taken from
the output, terrorism, external conflict and internal conflict equations,
respectively.
We incorporate these through equation (13) which shows that GDP
responds to all of the other shocks in a given year.
eY = α1 ⋅ ε T + α 2 ⋅ ε E + α 3 ⋅ ε I + ε y

(13)

eT = α 4 ⋅ ε I + ε T

(14)

t

t

t

t

t

t

t

t

eE = α 5 ⋅ ε I + ε E

(15)

eI = ε I

(16)

t

t

t

t

t

Table 5 provides the estimates of the Structural VAR described above. In
addition to providing coefficient estimates and standard errors, the table yields
the associated p-values from of over-identifying restrictions: p-value 1 is the pvalue from the test of the restrictions in equations (13) to (16).8 The remaining pvalues have alternative restrictions.9

7

The VAR also includes lagged investment and openness as exogenous right hand side variables.
They are included to provide continuity with our panel regressions presented above. The VAR
results are not affected by the exclusion of these variables from the analysis. The lag length for the
VAR estimates is set at two and, as explained above, we also include fixed effects and time effects
in the VAR. The results are robust to changing the lag length.
8
This p-value is derived from a χ2 test with 1 degree of freedom.
9
See Blomberg, Hess and Orphanides (2004).
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TABLE 5. STRUCTURAL VAR EVIDENCE
Sample

Full

NONDEMO

a

1

-0.475*
[0.247]

-0.765**
[0.379]

a

2

- 4.307***

- 6.094***

[0.895]
a

3

-1.267

**

[0.525]
4

a

7.735

**

[3.344]
***

[1.282]
-1.531

OECD

AFRICA

MIDEAST

ASIA

-0.169
[0.219]

-1.524**
[0.723]

0.029
[0.754]

-0.316
[0.372]

1.243

-1.966

-2.130

[1.430]
**

[0.659]
1.928

[1.170]
***

[3.518]

-14.303
-5.760
[2.827]

- 2.933
[1.130]
19.646

[18.505]
***

[1.800]
***

**

[9.045]
**

12.163
[5.765]

**

0.889

[1.365]
-0.567

[1.617]

[0.694]

*

-2.896

[13.447]

[7.714]

5.409
[5.627]

2.682
[2.085]

23.817

5

4.188
[0.923]

p-value 1
p-value 2
p-value 3
p-value 4
p-value 5
p-value 6

.242
.000
.000
.026
.000
.035

.376
.000
.000
.001
.000
.005

.388
.139
.044
.477
.042
.511

.567
.023
.038
.033
.035
.080

.569
.222
.308
.071
.336
.177

.542
.539
.195
.684
.199
.774

NOBS

4019

2438

835

1267

252

592

a

5.033
[1.035]

- 3.232

[2.327]
***

- 4.615***

Notes: See Table 4. The model is from a Structural VAR presented in the text,
equations (13) - (16).
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Figure 3 depicts the impulse response function for our Structural VAR.
The figure is arranged so with each column demonstrating the dynamic response
of the row variables to a one standard deviation shock to the variable denoted at
the top of the column. Starting from the upper most left corner, Figure 3 depicts a
one standard deviation shock to GDP on GDP, T, E and I, respectively. Columns
2 through 4 continue the exercise with the shocks from T, E and I, respectively.
Along with the dynamic response, the 90 percent confidence interval is also
plotted using the technique pioneered by Sims and Zha (1999).
The impulse responses in Figure 3 continue to demonstrate the robustness
of our findings—namely that terrorism has a negative and statistically significant
impact on growth. More importantly, the impact of terrorism on growth is shortlived—lasting approximately one year.
The implication is that the cost of 9/11 is most dramatic in the year of the
shock. However, we find that the shock should subside quickly. This means that
the cost in GDP terms should not be visible beyond one year in the future. In
short, we find again the cost of 9/11 to be approximately $60 billion with an upper
bound at $125 billion over the lifetime of the United States economy.
4. Conclusion

This study provides three contributions for our understanding of underlying
macroeconomic consequences of terrorism. First, the study proposes to estimate
the long run economic growth effects associated with terrorism. To accomplish
this task, we construct a panel data set that incorporates the economic data on
national income and growth, IMF data on financial conditions, data on domestic
and international terrorism incidents, and data on external and internal conflict.
Using this unique dataset, which spans 35 years for 177 countries, we examine the
dynamic effects of terrorism on economic growth, consumption growth, as well as
possible effects on capital accumulation and macroeconomic instability. The
panel dimension of this data is particularly useful as it allows identification of the
effects of terrorism on economic activity, growth and stability that may be evident
in long-run trends that cannot be detected absent long-horizon cross-country
comparisons. With these added degrees of freedom across the globe, we can then
extract the impact on the United States economy. These results suggest that the
economic consequence of 9/11 is $60 billion in 2006 terms.
Second, we explore the extent to which terrorism “crowds-in” and/or
“crowds-out” alternative forms of domestic and international conflict and the
potential differences in the macroeconomic consequences of these alternative
forms of conflict. This is of particular interest because terrorist episodes are far
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more frequent and persistent than are other forms of external and internal
conflicts. While terrorism and more traditional forms of conflict are not typically
considered as gross substitutes or complements for one another, the explicit
consideration of this issue is essential for understanding the macroeconomic costs
of terrorism per se, as opposed to the costs that might typically be identified with
other forms of conflict. We find that there are indeed important complementarities
between terrorism and other forms of conflict.
Finally, having established the empirical properties of how terrorism
affects economic activity as well as the extent to which terrorism affects the
nation-specific and world-wide frequency of domestic and international conflict,
the paper concludes by ”pricing” the macroeconomic impact of terrorism. We do
this by comparing the original estimate of $60 billion to other estimates, doing a
variety of robustness checks such as quantile regression analysis, structural VAR
estimation and welfare analysis. We find that our original estimates are robust to
the various types of estimation techniques.
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